light infantry

LIGHT INFANTRY

The basic historical data for this article was taken from the booklet “4^th Generation Warfare Handbook” by William Lind and Gregory Thiele.  It certainly wasn’t a bad book ( a big part of its purpose seems to be in trying to teach today‘s conventional armies to get their head out of their 2GW asses but I would wager on a return of our civil rights before that ever happens to the US Army ), but handicapped as an essay trying to be a real book ( a bit too fluffy and on the pricey side for what it is, but not a disappointment in content like much larger and cheaper books have proven to be ).  Still, authors of note must be supported (   I also bought his big novel on 4GW written under an assumed name of Thomas Hobbes.  I have little idea if it is worthy or not and that sucker set me back twenty bucks ).  His chapters on light infantry were refreshing and worthy of my further elaboration.

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Light infantry goes back quite a ways.  The Greeks had their heavily armored phalanx, but used less encumbered highly mobile ( “light” infantry can mean either less equipment or enhanced mobility depending on who is defining the term but a combination of both attributes seems to equal the more successful attempts ) light infantry as flank protection.  They used primarily distance weapons and never tried to hold ground.  They were attacking or retreating-mobility was primary.  The Romans essentially duplicated this.  Then, infantry lost most of its primacy during the middle ages and heavy cavalry was dominate.  That is mostly attributed to the scarcities that followed the collapse of Rome.  Overpopulation, declining soil fertility, loss of trade to import foreign grain, and loss of centralized monopoly on force in effect decentralized all governments.  With far less surplus energy to fight war with, conflict for a time was with a much reduced number of Knights rather than with legions of troops ( in this way, both governing heads and the military were one in the same and minimized energy requirements.  It was an outgrowth of the old tribal organization, to illustrate how far the collapse took society ).  It wasn’t until the nation state started to gain political power that larger armies started to proliferate. 

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The Spanish tercios in the 1500’s signaled the return of infantry domination.  Two hundred years later light infantry in the Greek model returned as a supplement to line infantry ( the large bodies engaged in rigid maneuver ).  They were flank protection, raiders and ambushers as well as recon.  Unfortunately, light infantry was usually a “let’s re-invent the wheel all over again every time” wartime creation.  After the conflict ended light infantry usually disbanded.  The reason for this is straightforward.  Militaries prior to repeating rifles and machineguns were First Generation militaries.  The tactics and strategies called for discipline and uniformity, rigidity and inflexibility ( the US currently practices 2GW, which is the same culturally, with the strategic difference of artillery [ to include air artillery ] dominating over infantry ).  Light infantry, to be successful, had to teach adaptability and self discipline which went over like a turd in the punchbowl with the regular military.  They were victims of their own success ( since individuality won the skirmish, and the military is decidedly anti-individuality… ).  Successful light infantry in the last century plus have been the Boers, Jaegers, Sturmtruppen, Chindits and IDF’s.  Semi-State forces would be Hezbollah and Pushtuns. 

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Now, here is a vital little statistic that was repeated numerous times in the book for clarities sack.  The MAXIMUM weight that light infantry could carry, observed over a historical time frame ( not just some arcane one off study ), and still move over long distances while remaining fit for combat at the end of that maneuver, was 45 pounds.  That included everything, from uniform and boots and rifle and ammunition to all  other gear.  Endurance over encumbrance.  Now, obviously, you don’t just go marching fifty miles without serious training.  Light infantry must be well trained, both to physical standards and mental.  But if they are forced to carry too much weight they cannot complete the mission they are entrusted with.  No matter the utmost physical condition of the soldier, carrying more than 45 pounds is detrimental to his performance.  You would think that the military brass, being interested in their tip of the spear troops increasing performance, would heed such advice, but then those running the show militarily have never been interested in the performance of their weapons or troops as much as they have been focused on the performance of their organization.  Again, it is far more important that their heavy line infantry is tasked with strengthening the infantry organization than actually performing optimally.  If heavy infantry is slaughtered because no light infantry is strengthening their flanks, why then even more heavy infantry and its sister support troops are needed more than ever.  And as a bonus they are all wedded to the rigid discipline and organization of centralized top down command.

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The number one rule of Bureaucracy is to strengthen its organization.  Job Security Is Job One ( or, in the Chinese phase, Protect The Iron Rice Bowl ).  As a potential insurgent ( hopefully four more years further away since Clinton wasn’t elected ) it is imperative that you emulate light infantry tactics rather than the line infantry ones our military is rigidly adhered to.  The only defense against light infantry is to be BETTER light infantry, and our empire is addicted to centralization.  It has no ability for its rigid bureaucracy to perform flexibly.  Just as the corporations you work for are incapable of independent thought or innovation ( the recent plunge in small business creation is not only bad from a independent worker standpoint, it bodes ill for any creativity in our economy-stagnation and implosion shall be the watchwords ), the military has been both the vanguard and the stalwart supporter for centralization.  Don’t expect much “out-fight the light” on their part.  Which, as Martha would say, is a GOOD thing.  You won’t have an advantage in logistics ( the Afghan fights had local popular support, WITH local production.  Here, food production is also centralized along with everything else ), so be thankful for tactical superiority.

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